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COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN THE SALE OF PUBLIC
UTILITY BONDS
Tin: completion of the Securities and Exchange Commission's hearings1
on the proposal to compel public utilities 2 to sell their securities through com-
petitive bidding 3 points sharply the current question in public utility finance. 4
To the suggestion that utility bonds 5 be sold only after the submission of
competitive bids by potential purchasers as a means of reducing underwriter's
fees and ending banking monopolies, investment bankers have noted an em-
phatic exception." Although the issue has become the subject of extensive
and bitter dispute,7 adequate analysis of the underlying problem is still
needed." It is the contention of this Comment that today underwriters' fees
1. The hearings were held during January and February, 1941. They received wide
publicity, being the first public discussion ever conducted by the SEC on any question
of policy. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1941, p. 23, col. 8; Feb. 6, 1941, p. 31, col. 8.
2. The hearings related only to utilities subject to the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79 (Supp. V 1939).
3. The Public Utilities Division has issued a report favoring competitive bidding:
THE PROBLEM OF 'MAINTAINING ARMt's-LENGTH BARGAINING AND COMIPETIT1VE ONDI-
TIONS IN THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES OF REGISTERED PULIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMPANIES AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES (SEC Pub. Util. Div. 1940), hereinafter
cited as PuB. UTIL. REPORT.
4. Commissioner, now Mr. Justice, Douglas posed the issue in tile famous Bond Club
speech in 1937. DOUGLAS, DMIocR "C AND FINANCE (1940) 32. Other recommendations
have followed. Commissioner Walker of the FCC recommended the FCC be given power
to require that the American Tel. & Tel. Co. system sell its securities through competi-
tive bidding. PROPOSED REPORT TELEPHONE INVTSTIGATION (FCC 1938) 705. See also
the dissenting opinion of Commissioners Eicher and Henderson in Consumer's Power
Co., 6 S. E. C. 444, 501, 503 (1939) ; Otis & Co.'s open letter to the ICC recommending
competitive bidding for all railroad bonds, N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec. 21, 1940, p. 26,
col. 1; and attempts of Halsey, Stuart & Co. to inject a competitive element into recent
bond issues, N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1941, p. 31, col. 5; N. Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1941, p. 29,
col. 2; N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1941, p. 31, col. 4.
5. This Comment is limited to competitive bidding in the sale of public utility bonds.
Competitive bidding in the sale of equity securities is of less importance and materials
for discussion are relatively scarce.
6. M1CCLINTOCK (Harriman Ripley & Co.), ComETTIVn E BIDDING FOR NEW IssUE-
oF SECURITIES (1939); STANLEY (President, Morgan, Stanley & Co.), COMPEnTIVE
BIDDING FOR NEv IssUES OF COR'OATE SECURITIES (1939); CONELY (President,
Investment Bankers Association), A REPLY (1940).
7. See notes 4 and 6 supra. See editorial comments: N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec.
.23, 1940, p. 18, col. 2; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Jan. 25, 1941, p. 10, col. 2; N. Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1941, p. 18, col. 2.
S. For general discussions see PUB. UTIL. REPORT; Abrams, Fallacy of Competi-
tive Bidding for Utility Securities (1937) 19 P. U. FORT. 414, 476; Elgen, Value of Com-
petitive Biddings for Utility Securities (1937) 19 P. U. FORT. 723; Report of Spec.
Comm. on Pub. UtiL Finance (1938) 415, ANN. PRoCE-niNos NAT. Ass'..- o R- R. &
Urn_ Coms,'Rs; id. (1939) 184; MOULTON AND AssocIATs, CAPITAL ExPANSIO:N, EM-
PLOYMENT AND Ecoxomic STABILITY (1940) 207; WILLs AND BOGEN, IVsErENT
BANIUNG (1936) 428. See also note 6 supra.
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are excessive, that they stem from the existence of more or less informal
monopolistic practices among investment bankers, so far untouched by the
regulating techniques of the Commission, and that the effects of these prac-
tices can be successfully curtailed only by a system of competitive bidding.
Present system of financing. The traditional method of selling utility bonds
involves a sale by the issuing corporation to a syndicate of investment bankers
called underwriters, at a price determined by private negotiation with the
principal underwriter, who is usually the corporation's banker and the orig-
inator of the business.0 The underwriters receive as compensation for the
risk assumed, for dealer's commission, and for management services, a fee
which at present averages $2 per $100 of principal, or two "points."' 1 But
when the risk involved in underwriting a utility bond issue is slight and
the services rendered by dealers in selling the bonds to a receptive public
are largely perfunctory, these fees may be excessive.
There is little risk in underwriting a utility bond issue today since it is
highly improbable the bonds will not find a ready market. It is a truism that
since 1930 new private capital expansion has halted. Normal investment
outlets have dried up and savings which formerly provided risk capital for
new enterprise have turned to more conservative investments, resulting in
a pile up of great reservoirs of capital in banks and other institutions now
desperately seeking suitable outlets for their billions.1' But these outlets are
few, and the result has been a tremendous demand for securities of the high
investment rating enjoyed by the average utility bond. Insurance companies,
revealing an insatiable appetite for high grade bonds, have even purchased
large blocks of bonds directly from the corporations issuing them.'2 Moreover,
as the great bulk of present day utility bond financing is refunding,18 former
holders frequently provide an almost automatic market for new issues. Under
9. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) Bk. V, cc. 8, 9, 10;
MOULOrN, op. cit. supra note 8, c. X.
10. The present average fee includes seven-eighths of a point for risk, seven-eighths
for dealers, and one fourth as the principal underwriter's management fee.
11. The situation is described in MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, c.c. I-IV, X. As to
insurance companies and their investments, see ANN. PROC. OF THE Ass'N OF LIFE IN-
SURANCE PRESIDENTS (1939) 108-119. Abandonment of the present "passive" financial
machinery in favor of a system of government-subsidized "capital credit" has been sug-
gested. See BERLE, NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW WORLD (1940) c. V; Hitchcock,
Twentieth Century Capitalism (March 1941) HARPER'S, 428,
12. Rodgers, Purchase by Life Insurance Companies of Securities Privately Offered
(1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 773; SELEcTED STATISTICS ON SECURITIES AND ON EXCHANGE
MARKETS (SEC 1939) 45. In 1940, excluding railroad financing, these private place-
ments alone accounted for 56% of all corporate bond and note emissions, while in 1939
they amounted to 43.7%. N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1941, p. 49, Col. 2.
13. MOULTON, op. cit. su pra note 8, at 36; SHULTZ AND CAINE, FINANCIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) 708; 152 Coia. & FIN. CHRON. (March 8, 1941)
1494.
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such conditions payment of substantial sums for the "risk" assumed by an
underwriter can hardly be justified. 14 Likewise, large payments to dealers
as commissions for services rendered in selling the bonds are objectionable.
In 1920 it was possible for the ICC to approve substantial underwriting fees
on the ground that an issue could be sold only in small blocks to scattered
individual investors, a process requiring an elaborate and expensive distri-
buting organization.' 5  Today there is no comparable problem of security
distribution and the task of selling the bonds of an average utility invulves
little more than the effort required to telephone a local bank or insurance
company. 1 Yet, because of the absence of competitive motives for reduction
of financing charges, underwriters and dealers are compensated as though
they performed a highly valuable and unique function.
The reasons for conditions under which such practices have flourished are
not unduly elusive. In the first place, the important investment bankers that
dominate the nation's corporate financing 17 do not compete among them-
selves.' s Rather, they have preferred to permit each of their number to
monopolize the business of financing certain corporations, a practice nurtured
by the peculiar ethics of the profession of investment banking. Once banker
X has handled Y corporation's financing other bankers will not offer their
services in connection with new financing by Y until it is clear that there
has been a "break" between X and Y.19 On occasion this non-competitive
tradition has been crystallized by agreements among bankers allotting to one
another rights to participate in the financing of future issues of corporations
14. See note 96 infra.
15. For this reason the ICC approved an underwriting fee of 3j2 points. Bonds of the
N. Y. Central R. R., 65 I. C. C. 172 (1920). But the Commission noted that absence ui
competitive bidding made it difficult to determine whether the fee was reasonable.
16. Two recent analyses of the distribution of certain high grade bond issues dem-
onstrated that 88.4% of the bonds went to institutional purchasers. Hearings before Ils
Temporary National Economic Commnittee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Pt. 24 (1940) 12,703
(hereafter cited as Hearings).
17. Hearings 12,688-12,711. Thirty-eight banking firms managed 91% of all issues
registered between 1934 and 1939. Of this amount, 57% was managed by six New
York City firms while 14 other New York firms and IS firms outside of New York man-
aged 21% and 12% respectively. Hearings 12,691. The degree of concentration is greater
as to high-grade bonds. 'Morgan, Stanley & Co. alone managed four-fifths of all first
grade registered bond issues managed by 38 leading firms in the United States. Hear-
ings 12,710.
18. BRANDEIs, OTHER PEOPLES MONEY (1914) 45; Tnorn AND AssoCIATES, Eco-
xoMIc PROBaO S IN A CHANGING WOM.D (1939) 604.
19. See note 18 supra. On one occasion Glore, Forgan & Co. refused a request to
become principal underwriter because it had been a member of the syndicate headed by
Lehman Bros., which had underwritten the company's prior bond issue. Glore, Forgan
& Co. apparently felt that it could not properly disregard the other banker's prior claim
to the business. Hearings 12,469-12,471. On other occasions Kuhn, Loeb & Co. recorded
its desire not to compete for a financing proposition when it developed tlmt another firm
had an historical claim to the business. Hearings 12,487, 12,503.
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assumed to be within the sphere of influence of one of their number. 0
Arrangements of this character seem to be agreements not to compete similar
to those held illegal at common law,2 ' but never having been challenged, they
have not incurred judicial disapproval.
In the second place, in spite of management's clear-cut obligation to
share-holders to sell the securities at the best price obtainable, the manage-
ments of utility corporations have not attempted to sell their securities on
a competitive basis, thus greatly strengthening the restraining effect of the
practices of the investment banking business. This failure of management to
inject a competitive element into security sales is not a fortuitous develop-
ment, but the achievement of financial groups which have an interest in
restricted competition. Instrumental in persuading management to shun
competition are certain beliefs held by investment bankers. Most familiar
are the tenets that a long-continued relationship between banker and cor-
poration has an actual value for the corporation,22 and that changing bankers,
or shopping around among various bankers to obtain the best price for an
issue, are indications that the credit standing of the corporation is unsound. 2
Although they have been frequently used, it has never been established that
these arguments embody more reality than myth. In the words of Com-
missioner, now Mr. justice, Douglas: ". . . the economic utility of con-
tinuity of banking relationships is of unestablished value to any one except
the banker.'" 24 It is axiomatic that the credit of an issuer rests on judgments
based upon its balance sheet, its earning prospects, and the competence of
its management, rather than upon the minute details of its distribution of
securities.
25
20. The classic example is the "Library Agreement" of 1920 by which shares in the
future financing of the American Telephone & Telegraph system were allotted among
J. P. Morgan & Co., Kidder, Peabody & Co., and other bankers. Hcarings 11,864-11,875
ct seq. Another famous instance is the financing of the Chicago Union Station Co. Hear-
ings 11,426-11,478. In both cases these non-competitive agreements were effectively car-
ried out. Hearings 12,234, Exhib. No. 1587 at 11,641. See also Hearings 12,353, 12,472.
Arrangements of this character are commonly referred to as "frozen accounts"; the
bankers involved are considered to have "proprietary interests" in the financing. ear-
ings 11,515, 11,570, 11,865.
21. HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1937) cc. III, IV.
22. Charles Adams, Trustee of Utilities Power & Light Co., testified that there was
an "intangible value" in having one firm continue to handle a company's financing. SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 2001, April 2, 1940, at 15. See STANLEY, op. cit. sapra
note 7.
23. See Newport Electric Corp., 4 S. E. C. 999, 1014 (1939); SEC Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 2001, April 2, 1940, at 15. For a successful departure from these
inhibiting concepts consider recent financing by Shell Union Oil Corp. Hearings 12,625-
12,664.
24. DOUGLAS, op. cit. sopra note 4, at 37. See also BRANDEIS, Op. Cit. supra note 18,
at 44. Long-continued banker-issuer relationships do not seem to have been of much
"value" for investors or issuers, in the light of the unbalanced capital structures, divi-
dend arrears, and bankruptcies in the public utility industry.
25. PuB. UTIL. REPORT 28.
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Arguments of this character are often unnecessary, however, because under-
writers are frequently in a position directly to require that there be no
competitive element in a corporation's financing. By controlling the sources
of capital,2 6 by exacting contracts which grant an option on future financing r.
and by utilizing interlocking directorates 28 and stock ownershipl bankers
have been able to influence the amount of their remuneration and to insure
the maintenance of their privileged status as principal underwriters. This was
especially true in public utility finance prior to the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, when banker control through stock ownership was
common 3 0 and was generally accompanied by monopolistic abuses 3 resulting
in rich benefits for the bankers involved. In brief, the system of non-com-
petitive privately negotiated sales has been a fruitful source of unreasonable
gain for bankers, in which the public interest that utilities be financed at
minimum cost has been ignored.32  On this record the system of private
negotiation has little claim to a place in the sale of utility bonds.
Attempts to regulate the present system. The sale of securities by private
negotiation with a single banker has not been altogether unregulated. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and
many state utility commissions have some measure of authority over the
terms and conditions upon which public utilities issue securities,L while the
26. FTC REPORT Ox UTILITY CORPORATIONS, Sen. Doc. No. 92, Part 72-A, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 75.
27. Hearings 12,546, 12,854-12,860.
28. See testimony in Hearings, 12,356.
29. FTC REPORT ox UTELIry CORPOmwRIONS, Sen. Doec. No. 92, Part 72-A, 7Uth
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 75-81, 111-116, 145-151.
30. See note 29 supra. For a specific instance of control and the unreasonable
charges which may result therefrom see Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., Licensee, 1
FED. POWER Com REP. 230 (1935) ; 1 FED. POWER Comm. RP. 367 (1937).
31. In the Report of the National Power Policy Committee the situation was suin-
marized: "Fundamentally the holding-company problem always has been, and still is,
as much a problem of regulating investment bankers as a problem of regulating the
power industry." NAT. PoWva POLICY Comm. REPORT, H. R. Doc. No. 137, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 6. See H. M. Byllesby & Co., 6 S. E. C. 639 (1940).
32. Consider the statement .of SEC Commissioner Henderson on the financing of
A. T. & T.: "That the capital was provided at the lowest cost and in a manner most in
the public interest is a question which cannot be answered. For at no time during this
entire period (1906-1939) did the bankers or the company consider any alternative method
of financing than that of direct dealings with a single banking group." Hearings 11,829.
See also PROPOSED REPORT TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION (FCC 1938) 506.
33. Sections 6(b) and 7 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act [49 STAT. 803
(1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. V 1939)] and § 204 of the Federal Water Power Act
[49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1939)] give the SEC and the Federal
Power Commission broad powers over security issues of public utilities. The jurisdic-
tion of the FPC is limited to security issues not regulated by state utility commissions.
In practice the Commission has assumed jurisdiction unless a utility's security issue is
supervised both by the state or states in which it operates and the state in which it is
incorporated. Application Tennessee Electric Power Co. (1936) 1 FED. Powm CoLr-.
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Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over railroad
financing.3 4 It is the function of these administrative bodies to protect the
public interest by requiring utilities to sell their securities on the best possible
terms, and to this end they have attempted to reduce underwriting charges
to a minimum. 35 In general these commissions, including the SEC, have deter-
mined the reasonableness of a given fee by comparing it with others charged
in selling issues of comparable size and quality, where similar conditions
have prevailed.30 Thus the usual fee, established by non-competitive private
negotiation and therefore misleading as a criterion, has become the touch-
stone for determining the propriety of underwriting charges in new issues.81
Acceptance of this norm may be explained in part by absence of administrative
vigor,3 8 lack of statutory power,3 9 or reluctance of commissions to interfere
with managerial discretion 40 in deference to judicial pronouncements that
commissions are not the financial managers of utilities.41 In addition, con-
REP. 668 (1940); In re Otter Tail Power Co. (1939) 1 FED. POWER Cotmm. REP. 794
(1940).
At present 17 states fail to provide explicitly for regulation of utility security is.4ttcs.
For an analysis of the various statutory powers which have been granted see the chart
in BONBRIGHT & Co., A SURVEY OF LAWS ON PUB. UTIL. Comm. REG. IN THE UNITED
STATES (1930). Since 1930 several states have enacted statutes regulating utility securi-
ties, among them Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. OR& CODE ANN. (Supp.
1935) § 61-289, 291; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1940) tit. 66, §§ 1241-1243; WASH. REv.
STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1940) § 10439-2, 4. A model statute for state regulation of
utility securities is suggested in Report of Spec. Comm. on Pub. Uil. Finascc, ANN.
PRoc. NAT. Ass'N oF R. R. & UTIL. COaIM'RS (1938) 419.
34. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. §20(a) (1934).
35. For a brief summary of the public's interest in low underwriting fees see ANN.
PROC. NAT'L Ass'N R. R. & UTI.. CoMM'Rs (1939) 184. See also INvESTIGATIoN oF
TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (FCC 1939) 593.
36. The burden of proving the reasonableness of a fee may be imposed on manage-
ment and underwriters. The administrative operations involved are discussed in Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., 33 P. U. R. (N.s.) 207 (1940). The SEC follows a similar
procedure. PuB. UTIL. REPORT D-15.
37. Since the Holding Company Act is designed to prevent lack of economy in the
raising of capital, an argument that a fee is "reasonable" solely because usual is not
persuasive. For the applicable cases see PUB. UTIL. REPORT D-14.
38. Insufficient appropriations and political interference have on occasion prevented
effective administration. MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933)
cc. V, VI. Berle speaks of the "decay" of the ICC in NEW DIRECTIONS IN A NEw
WoRLD (1940) 93.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. See concurring opinion of Commissioner Woodlock in Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Equipment Trust Series D, 99 I. C. C. 682, 690, 691 (1925). Contra: Consumer's
Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444, 460 (1939) (Commissioner Frank); MOSHER AND CRAWFORD,
op. cit. supra note 39, at c. VII; I SHARFMIAN, THE INrERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIsSION
(1931) 4.
41. See Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 202
U. S. 276, 289 (1923) ; People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1,
90 N. E. 60 (1909); Blue Mountain Consol. Water Co. v. Public Service Comm., 125
Pa. Super. 1, 8, 189 At. 545, 548 (1937).
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missions have feared that requiring departure from habitual banking practice
might seriously interfere with the success of new financing operations.4 2 Even
more compelling has been the reluctance of regulatory bodies to penalize a
utility by holding up an issue at the crucial period when market conditions
are favorable, merely because the underwriting fee may be improper.45 But
whatever the cause for its retention, reliance on the standard of the usual
fee is responsible for the maintenance of underwriting fees at their present
high level.
A second approach to the problem is based on the assumption that excessive
charges arise from the existence of control relationships such as interlocking
directorates between banker and issuer, or banker ownership of the issuing
corporation's stock.44 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:;
expressly designed to eliminate such evils, 40 contains the most complete
expression of this policy. Under Section 17(c) holding companies and sub-
sidiaries are not permitted to have a representative of any financial institution
as officer or director except where the SEC finds such relationships are not
detrimental to the public interest. Under Section 12(g) no "affiliate" of a
utility may enter into a contract with that utility witlout complying with
rules or orders to be made by the SEC regarding the maintenance of com-
petitive conditions. 47  Section 2(a)(11)(D) includes as a definition of
affiliate:
any person . . . (standing) . . . in such relation to such specified
company that there is liable to be such an absence of arm's-length
42. The ICC has been especially influenced by this consideration. See Bonds of Chi-
cago Union Station Co., 86 I. C. C. 529, 532 (1924).
43. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 1 S. E. C. 891 (1936); ANN. PRoCEEaiNts \.T. Ass'n;
OF 1L. R AND UTIL CO-TM,'RS (1939) 185.
44. Section 10 of the Clayton Act specifically provides that when a common carrier
is linked to a prospective purchaser by an interlocking directorate, or by a substantial
stock ownership by its directors, its securities should be sold through competitive bid-
ding. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 20 (1934). Also it is illegal for an officer
or director of a common carrier to receive anything of value in respect of the salc of se-
curities by such carrier. 41 STAT. 496 (1920), 49 U. S. C. §20(a)(12) (1934). Section
305 of the Federal Power Act applies similar rules to public utilities. 49 ST.AT. 839
(1935), 16 U. S. C. § 791 (Supp. V 1939). Likewise, the states have specially supervised
transactions where there is a control relationship. For example, the Illinois commission
has jurisdiction over contracts between a utility and an "affiliated interest," defined as
a 10% voting interest or any person which the commission may determine is actually
exercising any substantial influence over the policies of a utility. II.L. AnN. STAT. ( Smith-
Hurd 1940) c. 111 2/3, § 8(a).
45. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79 (Supp. V 1939).
46. Section 1 (b) (5) specifically declares that lack of economy in raising capital is a
detriment to the public interest.
47. At one stage the Act read "competitive bidding." 79 CoNG. REc. 10,557 (1935).
The language was changed to broaden its scope. 79 Cowa. REc. 8931 (1935). See als,
original language in §7(f) providing for competitive bidding. 79 Ct. . RE%. 10,305
(1935).
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bargaining between them as to make necessary . . , that such
person shall be subject to the obligations . . . imposed in this title
upon affiliates of a company.48
Thus any underwriter found by the Commission to be an affiliate under this
clause is subject to the special rule-making powers conferred by Section 12 (g).
The SEC did not invoke the broad language of Section 2(a) (11) (D) at
once, preferring to begin by employing Section 7(d) (4) which directs the
Commission to require that fees be reasonable. The even tenor of this
policy, however, was interrupted by the Kansas Electric Power49 case where
the underwriting fee was unreasonable by the Commission's standard and,
in addition, there was no satisfactory explanation for the automatic selection
as underwriters of bankers holding stock in the company's parent. The Com-
mission finally approved the company's declaration to issue the bonds by
a vote of three to two, but both majority and minority opinions warned the
financial community that the Commission strongly disapproved such rela-
tionships between underwriters and issuers, and that other cases involving
an absence of arm's-length bargaining might induce the Commission to
require competitive bidding. The problem was narrowed in the subsequent
San Antono 0 ' and Blackstone Valley Gasu' cases, where, although the fees
met the SEC's standard of reasonableness, the underwriters had ignored the
Kansas case warning and retained ties with issuers. In these cases the Com-
mission again intimated its disapproval of interlocks but did not refuse the
applications by making an adverse finding tinder Section 7(d) (4), since it
felt bound by previous decisions to hold these fees reasonable.
At this juncture several paths were open. The Commission could have
revised its standard of reasonableness in the light of the discussion above ;r"
it could have required competitive bidding ;53 it could have evaded the ques-
48. The power of the Commission to use §2(a)(11)(D) was limited by §2(b)
which provided that no person should be deemed an "affiliate" under §2(a)(11)(D)
unless the Commission, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, has issued
an order to that effect, the order not to be effective for 30 days. The other definitions of
affiliate in § 2(a) (11) depend on ownership of a specified percentage of stock.
49. 1 S. E. C. 891 (1936).
50. 3 S. E. C. 414 (1938). See also report of the Public Utilities Division of the
SEC on "disorderly competition" in a recent San Antonio Co. issue. SEC Release, Mar.
12, 1941.
51. 4 S. E. C. 77 (1938). See also American Light & Traction Co., 3 S. E. C. 969
(1938); Gulf States Util. Co., 3 S. E. C. 814 (1938). In considering SEC policy on
reasonableness and affiliation certain finder's fee cases are relevant. West Penn Power
Co., 3 S. E. C. 774 (1938); Connecticut Light & Power Co., 4 S. E. C. 60 (1938);
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 706 (1939); SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 2156, July 8, 1940. See Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance
and Mfanagement under the Public Utility Holding Company At of 1035 (1938) 52 IIAnv.
L. REv. 216, 238.
52. See pp. 1072-75 supra.
53. The Commission was not obliged to choose between general competitive bidding
or none at all. It could have proceeded from case to case, requiring competitive bidding
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tion on the ground the Act was not intended to penalize control relationships
not economically dangerous; or it could have' condoned the system of private
negotiation, attempting to eliminate interlocks apart from any question of
reasonableness of fees. The Commission finally adopted the last possibility,
believing proper interpretation of the Act required it, and promulgated Rule
U-12F-25 4 a regulation conclusively condemning financial -affiliation even
where underwriting charges were not found to be excessive. In substance the
Rule incorporated the definition of affiliate set out in Section 2(a) (11) (D) r5
and provided that no fee should be paid to any underwriter who was found
to be an affiliate of the issuer within the meaning of the Rule,50 unless such
underwriter had no more than a five per cent participation in the purchase
of the issue, and would not receive compensation as managing underwriter."
Even before the Commission attempted to apply the Rule where a finding of
affiliation would be necessary, the Rule revealed grave weaknesses. On three
occasions underwriters retained both interlocks and the power and prestige
of principal underwriter,5 8 avoiding a contest on the affiliation question by
restricting their participation to five per cent and receiving no management
fee.5 9 Thus the underwriters demonstrated that the sanction imposed by
Rule U-12F-2 was not sufficiently severe to cause all investment bankers
to renounce their connections with issuers.'- o
This failure of the Rule has been minimized to some extent by the recent
decision in the Dayton Power & Light case, applying the Rule for the first
time to prevent the payment of a fee to an affiliated underwriter.0 1 In
by "informal suggestion" when appropriate, relying for a --nction on its power under
§ 7(d) (6) to disapprove a declaration if the terms and conditions of an issue or sale
were found detrimental to the public interest. The ICC has used this informal method
in the sale of terminal bonds by competitive bidding. Bonds Chicago Union Station,
239 I. C. C. 325 (1940). Finance Docket No. 12797. This type of regulation, though
adapted to meet the special problem of interlocks, would be inadequate to cope with the
larger problem of reasonable fees in non-affiliate cases. It might be of great value in
the development of a competitive bidding policy for stocks. See note 5 supra.
54. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1380, Dec. 28, 1938 (Commissioner
Mathews dissenting). The Rule became effective March 1, 1939.
55. In Consumer's Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444, 456 (1939), the Commissiun stated
that it had "in substance" incorporated in 1 (a) (3) of the Rule the definition of affiliate
set out in §2(a) (11) (D).
56. Rule U-12F-2, (a).
57. Id., ff (d).
58. Normally the principal underwriter has the valuable privilege of selecting the
other members of an underwriting syndicate.
59. Gulf States Util. Co., 5 S. E. C. 170 (1939); West Penn Power Co., 5 S. E. C.
376 (1939); Iowa Public Service Co., 5 S. E. C. 619 (1939).
60. The custom of reciprocity in the investment banking business is so firmly in-
grained it seems probable that such affiliated principal underwriters distributed their par-
ticipation among non-affiliated members of the syndicate, selected by it, with the under-
standing that the favor would be returned in the financing of future issues. See Hear-
ings 11,529-11,534, 11,595-11,604.
61. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941.
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February, 1940, the Dayton Power & Light Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Columbia Gas and Electric Co., one of the sub-holding companies in the
United Corporation system, filed an application to issue and sell bonds
in the amount of $25,000,000 to a syndicate headed by Morgan, Stanley &
Co. The latter was to receive a management fee and to underwrite well
over five per cent of the issue.62 To test the efficacy of Rule U-12F-2 the
Commission initiated proceedings0 3 to determine whether Morgan, Stanley
& Co. was an affiliate of Dayton Power and Light Co., and thus barred
by the Rule from receiving any underwriting fee. To prove affiliation the
Commission had to demonstrate that Morgan, Stanley & Co. and J. P.
Morgan & Co. were in fact one, 64 and that Morgan, Stanley & Co., through
J. P. Morgan & Co., was in a position to assert a controlling influence"5
over the financial policies of companies within the United Corporation
system, founded by J. P. Morgan & Co. and Bonbright & Co. to protect
investments in utility securities and to secure the profits of utility financing. 10
It is common knowledge that since the creation of United Corporation,
J. P. Morgan & Co. and Morgan, Stanley & Co. have monopolized the
financing of companies within the system. 7  Yet it has taken the SEC
thirteen months to make a finding of affiliation between Morgan, Stanley
& Co. and Dayton Power and Light Co. In part this delay may have been
due to the evidentiary difficulties involved in proving affirmatively an absence
62. Dayton Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 787 (1940).
63. Previously, in connection with Consumer Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444 (1939), the
Commission had started proceedings to determine whether Morgan, Stanley & Co. and
Consumer's Power Co. were affiliates. The Dayton and Consumer's cases were alike in
that they both presented the question of an interlock through United Corporation. After
the Dayton proceedings were begun, those in the Consunsr's case were abandoned.
64. As a result of the Banking Act of 1933 J. P. Morgan & Co. withdrew from
the underwriting business, and in 1935 Morgan, Stanley & Co. was formed as an under-
writing firm. After the Dayton case, proceedings under the Trust Indenture Act of
1939 were commenced by the Commission to determine whether there was a control re-
lationship between Morgan, Stanley & Co. and J. P. Morgan & Co. which would dis-
qualify the latter from being a trustee in an issue underwritten by Morgan, Stanley &
Co. These proceedings, however, never reached a conclusion since J. P. Morgan & Co,
resigned the trusteeship. N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1941, p. 29, col. 8. For evidence of the
identity of J. P. Morgan & Co., and Morgan, Stanley & Co., see Hearings 12,049-12,086,
See also SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941.
65. As defined in §2(a) (11) (D).
66. T. S. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co., discussing certain investment trusts, stated
that their "purposes . . . are in a way similar to the one proposed (United Corp.) in
that . . . their purpose is obviously to insure continued control by the bankers . . ."
Hearings 12,070. However, United Corp. has filed a plan under § 11 (e) by which United
will not vote any of the utility securities held by it and will divest itself of its holdings
as soon as an opportunity is presented, thus hoping for a declaration it is not a holding
company under § 2 (a) (7). N. Y. Herald-Tribune, March 6, 1941, p. 29, col. 6.
67. For an account of financing of the United system see Brief for SEC Pub. Util.
Div., pp. 45-59, Matter of Dayton Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 787 (1940); SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941.
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of arm's-length bargaining where no explicit control exists ;"i it may also
be explained by challenges as to the legality of Rule U-12F-2 in setting up
a new definition of affiliate in contravention of the language of the Act.co
A strong indication of the administrative impracticability of Rule U-12F-2,
the belated decision is nevertheless significant, for if it is upheld by the
courts it presages eventual elimination of the interlocks which the SEC has
attacked.70 However, neither the Dayton decision nor other experience with
the Rule provides any assurance that underwriting fees will be reasonable
or that competitive conditions will be maintained in transactions involving
affiliates.7 1 These limitations, in conjunction with the failure of direct super-
vision of underwriting fees, indicate that other methods of regulation should
be adopted. The most desirable alternative is a system of competitive bidding.
Competitive bidding. For purposes of public utility finance, competitive
bidding involves an administrative requirement that a utility request sealed
bids in the sale of an issue of bonds, and that the bids submitted be listed
in the utility's application for leave to sell the issue to a banking group at a
price named in the application. -2 In form there is no compulsion to sell to
the highest bidder, but in practice administrative supervision and the fiduciary
duty owed by the corporation and its management to the stockholders operate
to assure the acceptance of the highest bid,73 provided the bidder is financially
responsible, and not unsatisfactory for other reasons. In any event, com-
68. At present J. P. Morgan & Co. possesses only 2 of 1% common stock interest
in United, and it is not otherwise represented by directors or officers. For a view of
the evidentiary problems in the Dayton case see briefs in Matter of Dayton Power &
Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 787 (1940).
69. In essence the argument is simple: Rule U-12F-2 sets up a new definition of
affiliate in violation of the language of § 2(a) (11) (D) and § 2(b). The statute de-
clares an affiliation exists when there "is liable to be such an absence of arm's length
bargaining" as to require application of the Act. The Rule omits the restrictive word
"such," thus attempting to confer powers broader than those conferred in the statute.
Also, by permitting a finding of affiliation to be made and applied in the same proceed-
ing, the Rule evades the language of §2(b) requiring that 30 days must elapse before
enforcement of a finding of affiliation made under §2(a) (11) (D).
70. For e-x-ample: SEC Holding Company Act Releases No. 1911, Feb. 2, 1940;
No. 1941, Feb. 26, 1940; No. 2259, Aug. 23, 1940. However, the only decision on affilia-
tion under the rule is the Dayton case.
71. The Public Utilities Division and the SEC have conceded the inadequacy of the
Rule. Pus. UTm. RFPORT 9; SEC SiXTH ANxUAL RPPorr (1941) 35. See also note
60, supra
72. For various forms of this procedure see PuB. UTiL. REroRT 45; Regulations
Relative to Bids of Carriers, 56 I. C. C. 847 (1920); Western Maryland Equipment
Trust, Series D, 111 I. C. C. 434 (1926); Public Service Co. of N. H., 17 N. H. S. P.
C. R. 367 (1935); MASs. Axx. LAWs (1940) c. 164, § 15; 12 P. U. R. (-.s.) 9 (1936).
73. The highest bidder is the bidder offering the greatest percentage of par at the
lowest interest rate, ie., the lowest cost of money to maturity. There are a very few
instances in which a bid other than the highest has been accepted. See PUB. UrM.
REPoRT C-31.
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petitive bids provide commissions with suitable evidence by which to judge
the propriety of prices to be received and fees to be paid.
Although it is occasionally urged that the SEC lacks authority to impose
a competitive bidding requirement, even a cursory examination of the broad
powers conferred by the Holding Company Act demonstrates that a com-
petitive bidding rule is not likely to stumble on the authority hurdle. 4
More important than the authority issue is the inquiry whether competi-
tive bidding will actually produce the desired reforms. It has already been
demonstrated that other methods of regulation have failed- because they
bogged down in procedural mires and because they did not attack the
fundamental problem: elimination of the customs and agreements which
make the system of private negotiation non-competitive. Competitive bidding
would achieve this objective by destroying the motive for banker influence,
and by relieving management of the pressures which have caused it to shun
competition. When sealed bids must be submitted, and the highest bid will
be accepted, it is apparent that the traditional underwriter is not certain to
get the business. Money and effort expended to influence corporate financial
policy will no longer assure the existence of a banking monopoly, and man-
agement on its part will be forced to assume an independent position divorced
74. It seems clear that the SEC has the power to adopt the proposed rule. Sections
6(b) and 7(a) (2) of the Holding Company Act grant power to the SEC to require that
a declaration (application) to issue securities shall include "such additional information,
in such form and detail . . . as the commission may . . . prescribe as . . . appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors and consumers." A competitive
bidding rule would come within this language because competitive bids furnish informa-
tion of value in passing on declarations. The Maine Commission has found authority to
require competitive bidding in similar language of the Maine Statute. Communication
to YALE L. J. from Pub. Util. Com. of Maine; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 62 § 41.
A competitive bidding rule can also be sustained under the general rule-makilng
power of §20(a), supplemented by §7(d)(6), providing that the terms and conditions
of an issue or sale be not detrimental to the public interest or to the interests of investors
and consumers, and by the language in §6(b), stating that the Commission shall on
certain occasions grant an exemption from § 7 subject to such terms and conditions as it
deems necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest. Since competitive bidding
reduces financing charges, it is in the "public interest" within these sections of the Act,
as well as the definition of "public interest" in the preamble.
The ICC, the Federal Power Commission, and the commissions of the District of
Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, operating under
statutes no broader than the Holding Company Act, have required competitive bidding
without incurring challenge or judicial disapproval. For the orders see 111 I. C. C.
434 (1926); FPC Order No. 62 (1939); 12 P. U. R. (N.s.) 9 (1936); P. U. R.
1918A, 325; P. U. R. 1928C, 354; General Order Missouri Commission (1938) ; 17 N. H.
P. S. C. R. 268 (1935); 6 P. U. R. (N.s.) 22 (1935). For the statutes see 41 STAT.
494, 49 U. S. C. §20(a) (1934); 49 STAT. 858, 16 U. S. C. § 825(h) ; D. C. Code (1929)
tit. 26, §§54, 97, 98, 102; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1940) §54-505; Mo. STAT. ANN.
(1940) p. 6618, § 5194; N. H. Pun. LAW (1926) c. 241 §3; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936)
tit. 66, § 202.
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from reliance on any financial interest.7 5 Fear of disagreeable consequences
which may prevent management from taking the initiative in introducing
competitive bidding will no longer be operative, 0 and experience shows
that a minimum of administrative supervision will be required, since the
presence of competition tends automatically to insure reasonable fees and
prices. 7
The pragmatic test of actual use demonstrates that the advantages of
competitive bidding are not illusory. Thus, in the period from 1920 to 1926,
when the ICC did not require competitive bidding for either equipment trust
certificates or railroad bonds, the average underwriting fees for the two classes
of securities were approximately 2.08 and 3.41 points respectively.-8 Since
1926, equipment trust certificates have been sold on a competitive basis,
and underwriting fees have averaged .68 and 2.42 points respectively,7 9
fees in equipment trust financing being reduced by two-thirds while those
charged in bond issues declined but one-third. The recent Report of the
Public Utilities Division of the SEC offers additional corroboration. Four-
teen utility bond issues sold on a competitive basis were compared with
159 bond issues sold through private negotiation. Underwriting fees aver-
aged 1.24 points in the competitive issues and two points in the negotiated
issues.80 The Report establishes, in addition, that a system of competitive
bidding does not nullify reductions in fees by increasing the "other expenses"
involved in selling the securities, such as the cost of preparing and printing
registration statements and indentures, and payment of legal fees.81
Beyond increasing the issuer's net proceeds by the amount of the reduction
in underwriting fees, competitive bidding further diminishes financing costs
by increasing the percentage of par received by the issuer, by reducing the
interest rate, or by both.8 2 Competition automatically tends to drive prices
75. 'Management is not always enthusiastic. See Northern States Power Co., 4
S. E. C. 728, 7.38 (1939).
76. See ERNST, Too BIG (1940) 195.
77. Undoubtedly this is one of the most important advantages of competitive bidding.
For an example of its smooth operation see 17 N. H. P. S. C. R. 367 (1935); 18 N. H.
P. S. C. R. 6, 48 (1936); see PUB. UTIL. REPoRT C-34. Likewise, in the sale of equipment
trusts, competitive bidding has been an effective administrative device. See remarks
of Senator Truman, N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1941, p. 29, col. 6. Cf. FPC Release No. 1383,
Jan. 8, 1941.
78. The figures are reported in Elgen, supra note 8, at 725. In 1922 the ICC held
a hearing on competitive bidding. Compare Bonds Chicago Union Station Co., 86 L C.
C. 529 (1924) with Bonds Chicago Union Station Co., 94 I. C. C. 177 (1924). See Locx-
LIN, REG. SECURITY ISSUES BY ICC (1927) 114-116. Later the ICC required competitive
bidding for equipment trust certificates. Western Maryland Equipment Trust, 111 I. C.
C. 434 (1926).
79. See note 78 supra.
80. PUB. UTiL. REPoRT C-22.
81. Id., C-25.
82. Waterman, Financal Fence Mending in 1936 (1937) 19 P. U. FonT. 211, 218.
Robert R. Young, director of Chesapeake & Ohio R. R., has declared that the Cincin-
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up and the custom of slightly underpricing an issue, practiced in negotiated
sales, disappears under competitive bidding. There are no statistics showing
the amount of saving actually involved, since securities issued under the
identical conditions needed to make fair comparisons cannot be found; yet
actual experience with competitive bidding in Massachusetts and Nw Hamp-
shire is evidence of its value in this respect. In Massachusetts8 3 annual reports
of the Department of Utilities s4 indicate that under competitive bidding the
companies have sold their bonds at unusually8 5 good prices and interest rates.
Although the Department has recommended the repeal of competitive bidding
laws as to certain stocks,8 6 it has conspicuously failed to make such recom-
mendations with respect to utility bonds, where the system has been emi-
nently satisfactory. Analogous experience in New Hampshire in requiring
competitive bidding for utility bonds offers additional proof.
8 7
Similarly, experience in several jurisdictions bears witness that competitive
bidding, in addition to the reduction of costs, eliminates monopoly in in-
vestment banking by preventing any one banking group from securing a
dominant position in a corporation's financing. Twenty-four of the nation's
large railroad systems have customarily sold their securities through certain
bankers who monopolized this financing.88 Since the 1926 requirement that
nati Union Terminal Co. saved $1,500,000 by selling its bonds through competitive bid-
ding in 1939. In 1941 the Terminal Co. plans to sell another block of bonds through
competitive bidding. N. Y. Herald-Tribune, March 5, 1941, p. 29, col. 4.
83. Competitive bidding is required by statute. MASS. ANN. LAWS (1940) c. 164,
§ 15. The statute was enacted to insure that utilities would sell their securities on the
best terms obtainable. See 34TH ANN. REP., MASS. BOARD OF GAS & ELEC. COMMISSION-
ERS (1919) 9. For a review f Massachusetts regulation of utility securities see BARNES,
PUBLIC UTILITY CONTROL IN MASSACHUSETTS (1930) c. II.
84. For the years following the enactment of the competitive bidding statute the De-
partment of Utilities was able to report that the companies affected were selling their
securities advantageously. ANN. REP. MASS. DE'T OF UTLITIES (1921) 18; id. (1922)
13.
85. Boston Edison Co. recently sold a $53,000,000 bond issue through competitive
bidding at a cost of money of 2.58%, reputed to be the lowest price ever paid by a utility,
See PUB. UTIL REPORT, C-37.
86. ANN. REP. MASS. DEP'T UTILITIES (1920) Pt. I, 30.
87. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 17 N. H. P. S. C. R. 268 (1935);
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 17 N. H. P. S. C. R. 367 (1935).
88. Northern Pacific Equipment Trust, 99 I. C. C. 164, 166 (1925). Consider also
Chairman Eastman's dissents on the subject of competitive bidding and banking no-
nopoly in N. Y. Central Equipment Trust, 99 I. C. C. 121, 124 (1925). Pennsylvania
Equipment Trust, Series D, 111 I. C. C. 241, 244 (1926); control of Louisiana & A. Ry,
Co., 150 I. C. C. 477, 491 (1929). Cincinnati Union Terminal Securities, 166 I. C. C.
499, 500 (1930). See also dissent of Commissioner Scott, 1 FED. POWER ComIm. REP. 794,
797 (1940). For a survey of .ICC competitive bidding policy see 3-A SIARFMAN, Tri
INTERSTATE COmmERCE CoamissioN 564-577. The ICC is still prepared to consider
competitive bidding for bonds if the credit standing of the issuer is as high as is usually
the case with public utilities. See Finance Docket No. 12,700 for Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Bonds, 236 I. C. C. 680 (1940).
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
equipment trust certificates be sold through competitive bidding, however,
the regular bankers have ceased to handle these securities.82 In contrast,
bonds, with one exception, have been continually sold through the customary
monopolistic banking channels.90 Significantly, the exception occurred when
the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, which usually sold its securities through
J. P. Morgan & Co. or Morgan, Stanley & Co., put up an issue for com-
petitive bidding and sold it through a different syndicate. 91 Furthermore, the
Report's analysis of bonds sold on a competitive basis indicates that victory
goes to the highest bidder rather than to the traditional undenrriter. 2 Hence,
competitive bidding, though not specifically directed at the problem of inter-
locking directorates and underwriter ownership of an issuer's stock, serves
as an effective insulator against these forms of control by insuring the main-
tenance of arm's-length bargaining in spite of such relationships. The pro-
posed system is to some extent an exemplary substitute for the unfortunate
Rule U-12F-2, which has not been altogether successful in producing com-
petition or in severing monopolistic affiliations.
Competitive bidding, however, has not been without its critics, who argue
that it will injure investors and issuers as well as underwriters and dealers.03
It is argued that by eliminating the regular banker who may insist that
protective provisions be inserted in indentures, investors will suffer. But a
major cause for creation of the SEC's powers under the Trust Indenture94
and Holding Company Acts was the failure of bankers to protect the interest
of the investing public;95 and these critics have not suggested the SEC will
not provide the necessary safeguards. Likewise, the contention that com-*
petitive bidding will cause losses to purchasers by forcing security prices to
levels unsustainable after the public offering, is of dubious validity. The
argument implies that it is zot in the public interest for utilities to sell their
securities on the best terms obtainable - the antithesis of the premise sup-
porting regulation of utility finance. Furthermore, overpricing is likely to be
89. MooDY's STEAM RAILROADS (1929).
90. MOODY'S STEA, RAILROADs (1939).
91. The new syndicate was headed by Halsey, Stuart & Co. and Otis & Co. See
Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Bonds, 230 I. C. C. 483 (1938), and testimony before the
Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, SE,,. REP. No. 25, Pt. 16, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1940) 19.
92. PuB. UTIL. REPORT C-31. The financing of A. T. & T. in the years 1893-1905,
when it sold securities through competitive bidding, demonstrates that the banking mo-
nopoly which has characterized the company's financing since 1906 did not exist during
that time. Hearings 11,830-11,845. DANIELIAN, A. T. & T. (1939) cc. III, IV. Attempts
to break the 3. P. Morgan & Co. (Morgan, Stanley & Co.) monopoly have failed. Wit-
ness President Gifford's refusal to accept a competitive bid from Halsey, Stuart & Co.
in the 1935 Illinois Bell Telephone issue. Hearings 11,935-11,941.
93. See note 6 supra.
94. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C. §77aaa (Supp. V 1939).
95. See, generally, FTC REPORT ON UTIUTy ConoRArToxs, Sen. Doe. No. 92, Part
72-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); SEC REPORT, Pt. VI (1936).
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curtailed by so-called buyers' strikes, and in any case the supposed injury to
individual investors is largely imaginary: the buyers of utility bonds are
mainly institutional investors purchasing for yield to maturity without regard
for short term price fluctuations. Nor is it likely that issuers will be injured
by losing the advice of a regular banker or his assistance in preparing regis-
tration statements and indentures. Utility management is able to formulate
its own financial policy,00 and although an independent adviser can be em-
ployed if necessary, 97 setting up registration statements and indentures is no
longer difficult.
98
Because competitive bidding involves changing the present system, it has
been urged that the intricate machinery laboriously devised for the marketing
of utility bonds will be upset.90 The experience of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire indicates, however, that competitive bidding need not interfere
with an issuer's time schedule or penalize underwriters by lengthening the
period during which they are committed but are unable to market the securi-
ties for lack of commission consents.100 It is also unlikely that the success
of competitive bidding will be limited to small issues or favorable market
conditions. Large issues sold on a competitive basis have so far been suc-
96. In practice management decides how and when new securities shall be issued
even before going to a banker. Furthermore, most of the holding company systems em-
ploy experts whose services are available at a minimum charge. In sales of equity se-
curities, however, which are less simple than refunding bond issues, investment bankers
may still furnish invaluable aid. Furthermore, the recent El Paso decision, SEC
-Holding Company Act Release No. 2530, Feb. 3, 1941, indicates that there may be con-
siderable stock financing in the future. See note 53 supra.
97. This alternative is subject to criticism in that the arm's-lentgth bargaining ques-
tion might be reopened if the independent adviser was potentially affiliated with the
issuer. Furthermore, by increasing the expenses of an issue it might detract from the
economic advantages of competitive bidding. However, there is slight need for an
independent adviser at present. See note 96 .supra.
98. Setting up an issue was an onerous task in early issues under the Securities and
Holding Company Acts. To avoid the liabilities imposed by the Securities Act under-
writers had to investigate issuers carefully. However, the necessary basic work has now
been done and preparation of documents for a new issue is but a matter of bringing old
ones up to date. Furthermore, under competitive bidding as well as under the present
system of private negotiation, issuers contract to indemnify underwriters against liabili-
ties arising from the Securities Act. In New Hampshire, where the issuer draws up the
indenture and tentative registration statements, neither issuer nor underwriters have
found the procedure impracticable.
99. The process is complex because, in addition to authorizations from the SEC act-
ing under the Securities, Holding Company and Trust Indenture Acts, it is necessary
to obtain approvals from commissions in the states where the utility is incorporated, or
operates, and perhaps of the Federal Power Commission as well. All these consents
must be secured without upsetting the planned time schedule.
100. For several years underwriting contracts have contained "market out" clauses
which relieve an underwriter of obligation in case of market changes. Such clauses can
also be used when an issue is sold through competitive bidding.
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cessful' 01 and depression experience shows that a favorable market is not
indispensable.
Nor is it likely that competitive bidding will be :abotaged by a concerted
refusal to submit bids, 0 2 since arrangements to chill bidding are illegal and
may even invoke the sanctions of the Sherman Act.10 3 Furthermore, the
activities of underwriting houses like Halsey, Stuart & Co. and Otis & Co.,
which are eager to submit competitive bids, provide a practical guarantee that
other bankers will not desire to risk losing the business to them by refusing
to compete. 1' 4
Though not an open sesame to financial democracy through which tile
"little fellow" can rise to prominence and destroy the hegemony of the large
underwriters, 0 5 competitive bidding would achieve substantial reforms. By
forcing large financial institutions to compete among themselves it would
reduce underwriting fees, end banker monopoly, and open the business to a
few bankers now squeezed out by the superior capital, prestige, and experience
of the established investment houses. In any event, it seems clear that high
grade, eminently saleable, utility bonds should be sold on a competitive basis,
thus terminating a system of private monopoly in the financing of corpora-
tions in which the public has a vital interest. 10 0  J K. Busnvt
101. See note 85 supra; Pu. UTr. REPORT, C-34. In the few cases where an issue
might be so large that only one syndicate would submit a bid, no serious difficulty need
.exist, for the issue could be subdivided and sold in blocks.
102. In practice there is free competition. For figures on number of bids and syndi-
cates see PuB. UTi. REPORT C-34, C-37. But see Bonds Chicago Union Station Co.,
239 I. C. C. 325 (1940), in which 107 invitations to bid were sent out and only one re-
ceived. But issue was sold to regular bankers by private negotiations at a price higher
than that named in bid. The ICC implied its disapproval of this "sit-down strike" by
capital. Finance Docket No. 12,797; Hearings 11,807-11,817. See note 20 supra.
103. Agreements to interfere with free competitive bidding are against public policy.
See Tate v. Gould, 175 Ark. 306, 299 S. W. 24 (1927); Finley Co. v. Standard Asphalt
Co., 104 Fla. 126, 139 S. 795 (1932). Such activities may be tortious. REsTATzmnE:T,
TORTS (1939) § 765. Or they may constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. United
States v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893), aff'd, 175 U. S.
211, 244 (1899). Furthermore, an agreement to restrain competition may be inferred
from the acts of the parties; an express agreement is unnecessary. Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U. S. 208, 221 (1939).
104. See notes 4, 91 supra. If it should appear that a competitive bidding require-
ment wvas being flouted, issues could be sold directly to insurance companies, thus nullify-
ing the effectiveness of understandings not to compete. Consider also the role of the
RFC in railroad financing, where it has frequently intervened to insure that private
bankers were buying railroad securities on reasonable terms. Just recently the RFC
purchased a large issue of municipal bonds when it seemed that underwriters were tak-
ing advantage of their position to require too high an interest coupon. See U-NTED STATES
NEws, *Mar. 14, 1941, p. 35.
105. See Eaton, Financial Democracy (1941) 8 U. oF Cmi. L REv. 195.
106. See note 35 supra. See also letter of 1905 of Lee, Higginson & Co. to A. T. &
T. recommending that the company take advantage of its high credit standing by selling
its securities through competitive bidding. Hearings 11,830.
t Third Year Class, Yale Law School.
